Thomas P. Daly Author of RAGE COMPANY

A special thanks to Jack Healy from the New York Times. His article in today’s issue captures not only Abu Ali’s story, but places it in the context that is Anbar Province today.

Well done.

You can read his piece here.

“New York Times Looking For Thomas P. Daly” is probably an email that needs to be read. I received such a subject line two weeks ago. As my hotel’s wireless connection slowly downloaded the page my mind jumped from the comfort of corporate training to a distant past more than four years removed.

The location was Ramadi, Iraq, the beating heart of the Sunni insurgency and the nexus of al Qaeda in Iraq’s operations. It was a place where you were treated daily to the sounding off of rifles, machine guns, and a litany of explosions. Amongst the city’s concrete wasteland nothing grew but hate; while the wrath of war was an everyday affliction. Simply put, the coming storm had arrived for the 400,000 who called the capital city of Anbar Province home.

Sometimes it’s an experience better forgotten than spoken of. I read into the email:

“Hey Thomas,

This is Jack Healy of the New York Times. I’m in Baghdad and got your email from, of all places, a Sunni sheikh outside of Ramadi, in the village of Jueba.

We’ve been looking into the death of a guy named Hamid Shahab al Fadawai, also known as Abu Ali. Depending on who you ask, he was either an early leader in the fight against Al Qaeda in Anbar Province, or he himself was a terrorist. He was killed a few days ago by Iraqi Army forces who were trying to arrest him on a 2-year-old warrant, and we’ve been trying to get to the bottom of who he was and figure out what happened.

Do you remember him from your time in Ramadi at all? His family said you’d know him. I’ll forward you a picture of him as well.”

My heart sank. Abu Ali wasn’t just an early leader, he was the reason America defeated al Qaeda in Ramadi. A Saddam-era infantry officer and likely a nationalist insurgent in the early years of the conflict, I met Abu Ali on a dusty highway within the eastern outskirts of the city in January, 2007. With a Kalashnikov slung over his chest, wearing the chocolate chip camouflage uniform of the early 90’s, a ski mask, and twenty-four similarly clad locals around him, I think I had four machine guns pointed at the group while I strolled up. When our mutual mistrust nearly destroyed all cooperation after the first mission, Abu Ali was one of five who returned for the second. His reasoning was simple. While embracing our company commander he said he would help us until al Qaeda was defeated or he no longer drew breath. A strong statement, but one could sense the hatred in his eyes was genuine when he told you of his brother’s beheading that al Qaeda forced his brother’s wife and daughters to witness.

Over the next month and a half Abu Ali lived up to his promise. He personally helped us capture over fifty insurgents, led us to an al Qaeda regional military commander, lost another brother to beheading, earned the nickname “the grenade thrower” for killing an al Qaeda commander during an Iraqi version of hot-potato, convinced Jueba’s neutral tribes to rise up and crush the al Qaeda led tribes, turned those tribal fighters into a police force, and then became the Chief of Police for Jueba – only to be killed by his government for being an al Qaeda terrorist four years later.

Abu Ali is on the floor, thumb raised.

Forty-five minutes later I was speechless. Abu Ali had been shot seven times in the back, at his own house. The Iraqi Army claimed he ran, but Abu Ali was a survivor. He would have known the Iraqi Army was coming to his home; they would’ve driven miles through his tribal area – plenty of time for warning. If he were to run, it would’ve been before the Iraqi Army arrived. For Abu Ali to be shot in the back at his own home meant one thing: he knew he was about to be executed.

Thousands of Ramadi’s citizens also found Abu Ali’s death highly suspect. Jack had gone to the city after seeing reports of them protesting and clashing with Iraqi Army troops in early June.

Then, on June 7, the Iraqi Army acquiesced to the protesters of Abu Ali’s killing and withdrew from areas east of Ramadi.

It was all very tough to swallow. Abu Ali had risked everything by doing the unthinkable, assisting America. For four years a combined team of 10,000 Marines and US Army soldiers were unable to pacify Ramadi. Yet, in the spring of 2007 we went from counting body bags, ammo, and days until redeployment, to assisting men like Abu Ali in eradicating al Qaeda. The successes of our efforts spread through the tribes of the lush Euphrates River Valley like a wildfire on a dry plain.

Yet, there is more to this story. The Iraqi Army’s First Division is responsible for Anbar. In 2009, the same year Abu Ali’s arrest warrant was issued, the leadership of the division (Sunnis) was replaced by Shia officers more loyal to Baghdad. While the specific reason is unknown to me, my instinct says that Abu Ali’s killing was planned. A former Saddam officer and hero of the Anbar Awakening, shot in the back, at his home, by Shia led government troops… it’s enough to enflame the entire Sunni population of Ramadi and potentially Iraq. I can think of one geographical neighbor that wouldn’t mind such a scenario.

In some ways the tragedy of Abu Ali’s death is the broader story of Iraq today. After years of economic and physical sacrifice there are many who would attempt to unravel what America has sown. We must recognize that Iraq is not some backwards country destined to a future of failure. It is the most secular, western Arab nation with an identity shaped over thousands of years and natural wealth beyond comprehension. Our political leadership should be fostering cooperation rather than demanding war reparations.

The sun may have set for Abu Ali but we should not allow him to pass into obscurity. Instead, we should cast his shadow far and wide in recognition of his battlefield heroism and sacrifice. When America needed an ally he stood up. Then we left. Do not let him die alone. Give him the remembrance and admiration, the respect, of a hero’s death.

A young American caught up in the harsh reality that is Syria’s revolt against tyranny… this story is compelling.

Gadhafi, the mad-man of the North African desert, has outsmarted the developed nations
of the world. I’m talking about the guy with the giant sunglasses, Ukrainian wet nurse
and a fashion sense that belongs on the other side of the Mediterranean.

This tyrant, with a cadre of all female bodyguards, repeatedly appears in public and
presents himself as a lunatic (especially at the onset of the current Libyan crisis). This is a
calculated move by the Libyan leader. But, for someone who is now on the receiving end
of Western firepower, most of us wouldn’t consider that very smart.

Then again, this isn’t about smart, it’s about war. Of all people Gadhafi is a professional.
He came to power by the sword and has survived for forty years with that same sword.
His capabilities are evident. Within a week Gadhafi turned a situation that seemed
hopeless for him into one where he was only hours away from crushing the current
rebellion in Benghazi.

Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, these were all examples for Gadhafi to analyze. When
Libya’s Jasmine revolution began he had prepared his strategy. Kill the protesters. There
would be only one outcome of such an action, which would mean that was his intent all
along; allowing this revolution to spread. But why would he do such a thing? The answer
is pretty simple, survival.

Naturally, those who weren’t enriched by Gadhafi hated him, but distinguishing who
was who on the streets needed to be cut and dry. By playing the raving madman the
populace became emotional. They rose up everywhere. This provided Gadhafi, the one
with the army and resources to sustain it, two things: a clearly identified enemy and an
international community that thought he would be overthrown in a matter of days. His
objectives became simple, place the internal enemy between the crosshairs and lull the
external into a false sense of victory.

His actions also made his disorganized, rag-tag rebel-enemy predictable. And by the way,
if there is one word you never want to hear on a battlefield that’s the one.

As the world seemed to crumble around Gadhafi his troops were unable to “liberate” the
cities of Zawiya and Misrata. In brief skirmishes the rebels even captured Ras Lanouf.
This all served to embolden an already emotional, undisciplined mob. Doing exactly what
Gadhafi wanted, this band of citizen-soldiers hopped in their pickups and drove straight
towards Tripoli. Waiting for them was a balanced mix of armor, infantry, artillery and
aircraft.

For the international spectators the media would report events in the direction of the
outcome they wanted: another brutal dictator being toppled by his people. This fueled the
West’s fantasy that waiting it out was the best option.

In quick fashion the rebels learned that patriotism doesn’t deflect bullets, block shrapnel,
shoot down MIGs or stop tanks. In town after town along the Mediterranean the rebels
were thrust back. In the city of Benghazi they holed up for one final stand. Minus a few
French sorties and this would be over.

Defeating the rebels militarily wasn’t the only problem Gadhafi faced. In order to reassert
control over the populace he needed to provide his people with an excuse to explain their
actions. Hence the ridiculous story about al Qaeda and its terrorist uprising. Mix in the
Libyan stimulus package ($400 in every bank account, interest free loans), a massive aid
convoy to Benghazi, proposed reforms by the younger Gadhafi and maybe risking your
life to protest after Friday prayers wasn’t such a good idea.

This was a masterful move from the aging despot. In the better part of a week he
re-established the fear associated with his name amongst the Libyan people. After
Gadhafi’s “liberation” the citizens of Zawiya, Ras Lanouf and Ajdabiya have seen the
price of resurrection up close. Even now, with the West raining its firepower all around
him, Gadhafi is strongly positioned.

Clearly, he knows his enemy. Unlike America, Gadhafi didn’t view the situation through
the prism that is Iraq or Afghanistan. With an American President politically incapable
of “going it alone” he had already mapped out our standard escalation procedure via the
UN. He knew Obama would not strike him quickly. Hence, the strategy that would bring
his enemies to the forefront, provide them a glimmer of hope, all to be brutally crushed
before anyone could come to their aid.

As Libyan armored vehicles began to enter Benghazi, Gadhafi’s victory was only hours
from being complete. Images of his soldiers displaying fake pink flowers and thousands
of posters bearing his profile would mark an achievement fitting of his “King of Kings”
title. There was only one problem for Gadhafi: he misjudged Barack Obama.

With Gadhafi gaining the upper hand America’s President appeared weak. After
declaring that Gadhafi “must go” the West was idly watching the rebels slaughtered in
town after town. YouTube videos of tanks firing their main guns at civilians, protesters
mowed down in the street and civilians in a red sedan flattened under the tracks of an
armored vehicle were seemingly tolerated.

Or were they? Without such horrific images what force could Barack Obama justify
to remove Gadhafi? Wait, that’s not our objective? Don’t be fooled. While America
has made many statements opposite, make no mistake, there is only one goal of our
intervention in Libya: regime change.

After a history of frustration for America in limited warfare the Obama administration
seems to be the first to embrace the tenants of modern conflict. He has successfully
waged war against the Libyan regime physically, politically and morally. Unlike our
struggles in Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq I and II, as well as Afghanistan the Libya conflict has
a completely separate tone.

Early on in the conflict the West easily painted Gadhafi as a murderous tyrant. As
mentioned earlier, this was probably part of Gadhafi’s plan and likely anticipated.
However, in many conflicts America quickly lost the moral high-ground in places like
Vietnam, Iraq and even Afghanistan, although America’s troops were being held to a
much higher standard than its foes. As hard as Gadhafi has tried in recent weeks, he
hasn’t succeeded in reversing Americans view that Obama’s cause is just.

Politically is where the source of Obama’s success has emerged. The President’s strategy
has been simple, deny Gadhafi a target. By offering confusing statements and murky
objectives Gadhafi has struggled to identify America’s intentions and couldn’t possibly
expect what was coming. When victory was so close for the despot, America inserted
language that turned the UN resolution authorizing a no-fly zone into a declaration of
war. In one swift motion Gadhafi’s successes became the hangman’s rope for hundreds
of pro-Gadhafi troops laying siege to Benghazi. In response, Gadhafi tried strategies that
have worked against the West in the past: offering negotiations when in reality staying
on the offensive, exaggerating collateral damage, the all-of- a-sudden rational personal
letters, etc. None of which even drew a response.

As the overt confusion over America’s objectives placated the international community
into signing off on the no-fly plus, Obama prepared his physical message. Immediately
upon ratification of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 America’s intent became clear.
Not only did we destroy his capacity to conduct an air campaign we began to crush the
Libyan army in the field. A seventy plus vehicle convoy outside Benghazi, tanks and
armored vehicles laying siege to Misrata and Ajdabiya, Libyan warships along the coast,
aircraft still on the runway, arms depots, an artillery battery; all left in ruin. And, as a
personal message to remind Gadhafi’s closest advisors of Obama’s true intention: a few
bombs on the strongman’s palace.

Not quite the no-fly zone most of the world (myself included) thought Obama’s
diplomats were selling at the UN. And it has left Gadhafi with two choices: exile
or death. If he doesn’t choose the first a missile, rebel, or dissatisfied supporter will
eventually provide the later.

By the way, domestically the Libya situation is potentially a huge win for the President.
With the confusion surrounding his strategy the President has been attacked by left and
right. It’s the same ploy as the “birther” debate. Obama is baiting his political foes into
a fight they can’t win. To those who would question his action they will be labeled as
complicit in Gadhafi’s humanitarian catastrophe. On the opposite end, those who argued
for quicker action will be labeled as favoring the unilateral style of Bush used in Iraq II.

While the situation in Libya remains ever-changing the performance of the Obama
administration to date has come as a welcome surprise. Currently, America is in the
driver seat and I doubt a Libya that includes Gadhafi will be at the finish line.

For those of you who missed it this weekend, CSPAN’s BookTV has uploaded the video of Rage Company’s event online. You can view it here.

Semper Fi!

An Apache flies in support of Rage Company over Julayba, Iraq.